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Imagine there was a generic version of a brand-name
car. Now imagine that the makers of the generic car
were allowed, by federal statute, to make the generic
car because it was identical to the brand-name
car in every way except its name and lower price.
Additionally, federal regulation, interpreted by case
law, allowed for the maker of the brand-name car
to be held liable under a failure to warn theory, but
disallowed the same for the generic car. Moreover,
the maker of the generic car could not, by law, amend
its user manual to warn about hazards of the usage
of the car unless the makers of the brand-name
did so first. This is a simplified illustration of the
differences in liability and ability to warn consumers
between brand-name and generic drugs.
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA")
regulates all drugs, which necessarily includes
generic and brand-name drugs.1 However, as
the regulatory scheme currently stands, generic
manufacturers cannot unilaterally alter their warning
labels, as they must be identical to the brand-name
warning labels.2 The Hatch-Waxman Act created
this regulatory scheme.3 It was intended to, and has,
accomplished the goal of increasing access to new
drugs by allowing a generic drug company to enter
the market by simply showing its drug to be identical
to an already approved brand-name drug.4 However,
as seen in recent cases, a plaintiff who is injured by
a generic drug may have no recourse in a failure to
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warn tort claim because federal preemption prevents
the generic manufacturer from complying with both
state and federal law.' Generic manufacturers have
prevailed on the theory of impossibility preemption,
arguing they are precluded from complying with
federal and state law, because under federal law
they cannot unilaterally strengthen their warning
label, regardless of whether they are informed of
adverse events.6 Recently, however, the possibility
of a plaintiff prevailing on a theory of design defect
has been raised as an alternative to hold generic
manufacturers liable when a consumer is injured
by their product.' This Comment will discuss the
controversy and possible solutions.
II. REGULATORY STRUCTURE
A. Background
The FDCA gives the FDA the power to regulate
drugs.' For the purposes of the FDCA, a "drug" is
defined as, "intended for the use in the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man
or other animals."9 All drugs must be approved by the
FDA prior to being distributed or marketed under the
"new drug application" ("NDA") procedure.10 The
Drug Amendments of 1962 were the most important
change in the FDCA's drug regulatory framework,
as they created a shift from premarket notification
to premarket approval for safety and effectiveness.II
Prior to 1962, a drug manufacturer was required to
submit a premarket notification NDA that would
become effective after 60 days if the FDA did not
oppose it. 12 However, the 1962 FDCA Amendments
fundamentally changed the NDA process to one
of premarket approval, requiring multiple steps
of clinical testing to demonstrate the drug's safety
and effectiveness prior to FDA approval.13 After
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the passage of these Amendments, the regulation of
drugs became one of the most contentious and vital
functions of the FDCA.14
A pioneer drug manufacturer is required to perform
considerable clinical testing showing the drug is
safe and effective." The NDA processes usually
last between five to ten years, and for every 5,000
new chemical entities that begin, approximately only
one will survive to be approved as a drug under an
NDA.16 The cost of this process is borne exclusively
by the brand-name manufacturer and averages
almost $1 billion per drug.17
Prior to any human clinical testing, the brand-name
manufacturer must show anticipated risks associated
with the drug, based on pharmacological and
toxicological data obtained from animal studies.' 8
The brand-name manufacturer is then required to
conduct multiple stages of heavily regulated clinical
testing investigations in human subjects that show
whether the drug is effective and safe for use. 19
While the NDA must show that the new drug is
safe and effective, no drug has ever been shown to
be completely safe.20 The broad safe and effective
requirement has been interpreted by the FDA to
mean that the benefits of the drug outweigh the
risks.21
The new drug must conform to the labeling
requirements of the FDCA.22 The FDA completely
controls the drug label, which must contain adequate
approved directions for use, warnings, side effects,
contraindications, and effectiveness.23 Once the
NDA has been approved, the drug is "listed" as an
approved drug. 24 After the NDA has been listed
as an approved new drug, the manufacturer must
maintain records of research on the drug and
report any adverse effects. 25 This includes annual
reports detailing new information about the drug or
unexpected complications that affect the safety or
effectiveness of the drug.26
A notable process associated with the change in
warning label is the "changes being effected"
("CBE") process. 27 Under certain conditions, the
CBE process requires a brand-name manufacturer to
unilaterally change the warning label without prior
FDA approval. 28 When a brand-name manufacturer
becomes aware of the need for an additional warning
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label, it is required to add the new information to
the labeling "as soon as there is reasonable evidence
of a causal association" between the adverse event
and the drug.29 Further, brand-name manufacturers
must delete content from the warning label if
it contains "false, misleading, or unsupported
indications."30 Additionally, under CBE, a brand-
name manufacturer may strengthen the warning label
regarding "a contraindication, warning, precaution,
or adverse reaction," which can include changes to
dosage or administration of the drug.3 '
B. The Hatch-Waxman Act
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, also known as the Hatch-
Waxman Act ("Act"), established a new FDA
procedure for generic drugs to be approved based
on the authorization of an equivalent pioneer drug,
or brand-name drug, known as the abbreviated
new drug application ("ANDA"). 32 This Act was a
compromise: manufacturers of generic drugs would
no longer have to conduct and report the expensive
clinical testing required of a pioneer drug, and
in return pioneer drugs received extended patent
exclusivity.33 ANDAs piggyback on a brand-name
manufacturer's NDA. 34 An ANDA is required to
show that the generic drug is the bioequivalent of
the approved brand-name drug, also known as the
"listed" drug.35 Additionally, an ANDA must provide
a copy of the labeling for the "listed" brand-name
drug, a copy of the proposed labeling for the ANDA,
and a side-by-side comparison of the generic and
brand-name drug. 36 The "side by side" comparison
between the generic and the brand-name drug
emphasizes the fact that the generic and the brand-
name drug must be identical in every way, including
the formula and warning.37 Unlike a brand-name
manufacturer, a generic manufacturer does not have
to demonstrate the results of preclinical and clinical
testing of safety and effectiveness. Notably, the
labeling requirement for an ANDA requires the
generic manufacturer to demonstrate that its labeling
is identical to that of the brand-name manufacturer.39
The Act was enacted to advance two important
public policies. First, Congress wanted to provide
explicit patent protection and a period of market
exclusivity for brand-name drug manufacturers. 40
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As brand-name manufacturers invest significant
time and resources in the IND and NDA processes,
Congress wished to provide an incentive for drug
innovation.4 1 Second, Congress sought to encourage
lower prices and availability of generic drugs after
the brand-name patent protection and market
exclusivity expired.42 Overall, this framework has
successfully provided greater access to generics
through lower prices and greater availability, but it
is questionable whether it has provided a benefit to
brand-name drug manufacturers. 43
C. Implications
The Hatch-Waxman Act is a friend of patients who
wish to obtain reasonably priced drugs, however,
the preemptive effects of the Act, as interpreted by
caselaw, are a terrible foe. The Act allows a generic
drug company to file an ANDA to obtain expedited
approval of a generic drug that is identical to a
brand-name drug." As an incentive for generic
drug manufacturers to create more affordable
alternatives to brand-name drugs, the Act also
provides the first successful ANDA filer with a 180
day period in which that generic manufacturer is
the exclusive manufacturer of the particular generic
drug sold.45 During the exclusive marketing period,
generic manufacturers typically price their drugs
only slightly less - about five percent - than the
brand-name counterpart.46 However, when a second
generic company enters the market, the price drops
an average of fifty percent.47 This achieves one of
the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act because when
multiple generic drug companies enter the market
drug prices are lowered and a wider array of drugs
are available to more patients.48
However, this lower price may come with the cost
of unintended consequences due to the Supreme
Court's recent holding in PLIVA Inc. v. Mensing.
A patient who is injured after receiving a generic
substitute for a brand-name drug dispensed by the
pharmacist, even though the patient may be unaware
the pharmacist dispensed a generic drug, will unlikely
be able to recover damages for a failure to warn cause
of action against a generic drug manufacturer.49 The
Act has been criticized for creating this statutory
dilemma due to federal preemption in state failure
to warn cases.50 Therefore, while the Hatch-Waxman
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Act improves accessibility to otherwise high priced
drugs it does so with the consequence of precluding
injured patients from recovering damages if they are
harmed by a generic drug.
III. CASE LAW: FAILURE TO WARN,
FEDERAL PREEMPTION, AND DESIGN
DEFECT LIABILITY
A. Wyeth v. Levine: Brand-name manufacturers
may be held liable under failure to warn.
Wyeth v. Levine involved a state cause of action
for failure to warn and federal preemption.5' Diana
Levine was administered Phenergan through the now
notorious "IV-push" method.52 The drug entered
her artery, caused gangrene, and as a result, her
arm was amputated.53 Levine filed suit against the
maker of the brand-name drug Phenergan on the
theory of common law failure to warn negligence
and strict liability.54 She alleged that Phenergan was
not reasonably safe for the "IV-push" method and
that its labeling failed to reasonably warn physicians
of the foreseeable risks of gangrene and amputation
when this method is used.55 Finally, Levine alleged
that the risks of losing a limb outweighed the
therapeutic benefits of Phenergan when administered
through the "IV-push" method.5 6 Wyeth alleged that
Levine's claim was federally preempted, arguing that
the FDCA establishes "both a floor and a ceiling" for
a drug's label.57 Wyeth pointed to the preamble of
a 2006 federal regulation governing the prescription
drug labels as evidence that FDA approval of
labeling explicitly preempts conflicting or contrary
state law.58
The Supreme Court held that Phenergan's label did
not contain an adequate warning for its administration
through the "IV-push" method and that the federal
regulation did not preempt the state law tort claim.59
The Court stated that Wyeth had a duty to provide a
warning of the risk associated with the "IV-push"
method, and could have done so through the CBE
process.60 The Court emphasized that a central
premise of the FDCA is that the drug manufacturer
retains liability for its label at all times.61 Moreover,
the Court pointed to the CBE regulations as proof
that the manufacturer is ultimately responsible for its
label as a safety precaution. 62
57
The Supreme Court rejected Wyeth's argument that
FDA regulations explicitly preempt state law.63 It
stated that Congress has not authorized the FDA
to directly preempt state law and that the Supreme
Court has never deferred to an agency's conclusion
that its regulations preempt state law.' The Court
stated that the 2006 preamble to the regulation was
insufficient to prove that the FDA and Congress
intended all FDA regulations to preempt state law.65
Moreover, the Court refused to accord the preamble
any deference, and criticized it as a procedural failure,
stating that the FDA finalized the rule without input
from the states, "articulat[ing] a sweeping position
on the FDCA's pre-emptive effect in the regulatory
preamble." 66
The Supreme Court emphasized that Congress did
not intend for the FDCA to preempt state tort suits.67
The Court further noted that the FDA has limited
resources to monitor the 11,000 approved drugs, and
therefore, state tort suits are an important means of
discovering drug defects and motivating people to
come forward for compensation.68 Also, state tort
suits support the assertion that the manufacturer
bears the ultimate responsibility for a drug's
label. 69 Finally, although Wyeth was a brand-name
manufacturer, the Court did not make a distinction
between brand-name and generic manufacturers,
stating that a drug manufacturer bears responsibility
for its labeling "at all times." 70
B. PLIVA Inc. v. Mensing: Federal law preempts
state tort claims against generic manufacturers,
who cannot unilaterally change a warning label.
In PLIVA Inc. v. Mensing,71 patients alleged
that PLIVA Inc., the generic manufacturer of
metoclopramide (brand-name Reglan), a drug used
for stomach disorders, knew or should have known
that the drug had a high risk of causing tardive
dyskinesia, a permanent neurological disorder.72
Gladys Mensing and Julie Demahy were prescribed
the brand-name Reglan, but were given the generic
metoclopramide by their pharmacists as a less
expensive generic alternative. The generic version
of metoclopramide was approved pursuant to the
Hatch-Waxman Act 74 that allows the FDA to approve
generic drugs that are identical to a brand-name
version. 75 Both women took the drug as directed
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for a period of years, and both developed tardive
dyskinesia. 76
The Supreme Court deferred to the FDA's
interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman Act and held
that a generic drug label may only display warnings
contained in the equivalent brand-name drug label."
The Court concluded that because PLIVA Inc. was a
generic drug manufacturer, the CBE process was not
available to make the type of change required by state
law. 78 Thus, the state tort claim based on a failure
to warn was preempted because federal statutes do
not allow a generic manufacturer to independently
change its label.79 The Court distinguished Wyeth,
stating that in Wyeth the manufacturer was a brand-
name manufacturer who had the power to unilaterally
change its label without FDA approval.80 The Court
acknowledged that the difference between Wyeth and
this case seemed trivial as the only difference was
that the manufacturer in Wyeth was a brand-name,
while the manufacturer in this case was a generic.81
Nevertheless, the Court stated that the way the statute
was written caused a preemption issue that must give
way to federal law under the Supremacy Clause.82
C. Bartlett v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co.:
Generic manufacturers may be held liable under
a theory of design defect.
While a plaintiff may not be able to recover from a
generic drug manufacturer under a failure to warn
theory of liability, Bartlett v. Mutual Pharmaceutical
Co. provides hope for a plaintiff to prevail under
a design defect theory of liability.8 3 This requires
a paradigm shift however, as the CBE process is
irrelevant in the design defect context.84 In the design
defect context, whether the manufacturer is brand-
name or generic is unimportant.85 Nevertheless, the
design defect theory of liability as applied to generic
drug manufacturers is important because it provides
a potential alternative theory of liability when a
plaintiff cannot otherwise prevail under a failure to
warn theory of liability.8 6
In Bartlett v. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co.,87 the First
Circuit rejected a preemption claim in response to
a state tort claim similar to that in PLIVA Inc. v.
Mensing, holding that federal law does not preempt
state law design-defect claims.88 Karen Bartlett
brought a strict products liability state tort claim for
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failure to wam against a generic drug manufacturer
of sulindac.89 Sulindac is a generic non-steroidal
anti-inflammatory drug ("NSAID"), manufactured
by Mutual Pharmaceutical Company ("Mutual"). 90
In rare cases, sulindac can cause Stevens-Johnson
Syndrome9 1 or toxic epidermal necrolysis ("SJS/
TEN").92 Bartlett's doctor prescribed Bartlett
the brand-name Clinoril for shoulder pain, and
her pharmacist dispensed the generic sulindac. 93
Bartlett's reaction to sulindac was severe. 94 Sixty to
sixty-five percent of her body was covered in open-
wound skin lesions. 95 She spent over 50 days in the
burn unit and her reaction resulted in permanent
near-blindness and severe disfigurement.96
Bartlett argued that sulindac's risks outweighed its
benefits, which made the product unreasonably
dangerous even though the FDA approved the
"safety and effectiveness" of the brand-name
version, Clinoril.97 The court held that it was proper
for Bartlett to show that sulindac was "in a defective
condition" and it was "unreasonably dangerous,"
even though it was approved by the FDA. 98 The court
noted that Mutual could have avoided liability had
it shown that sulindac was unavoidably unsafe but
nonetheless very useful. 99
The design defect theory of liability presents
an alternative to the indirect process suggested
in PLIVA, of placing the burden on the generic
manufacturer and the FDA to convince the brand-
name manufacturer to strengthen the warning
label. The court in Bartlett stated that "although
Mutual cannot legally make sulindac in another
composition, . . . it certainly can choose not to make
the drug at all; and the [FDCA] might permit states
to tell [a manufacturer] it ought not be doing so if
risk-benefit analysis weights against the drug, despite
what the Supreme Court made of similar arguments
in the labeling context." 00 Instead, under a design
defect theory of liability, perhaps the FDCA could be
interpreted to reserve to the states the power to tell a
drug manufacturer that it should not be selling a drug
if the risk benefit calculus is unacceptable.o10
The analysis in Wyeth v. Levine lends support to
using a design defect theory of liability. 102 Because
state tort suits motivate manufacturers to strengthen
their label, and the FDA does not have adequate
resources to monitor the thousands of drugs on the
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market, state tort suits are an important enforcement
mechanism.10 3 Strict liability in a state tort action
for design defect could add another layer of
enforcement." Additionally, this mechanism could
provide a patient who is injured by a generic drug
an alternative course of action: strict liability for a
design defect without regard to the fact that the FDA
approved the drug as "safe and effective."los
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Bartlett, to
resolve the issue of whether federal law preempts
state law design-defect claims.'0 6 Petitioner Mutual
argues that Bartlett is an outlier case, and regardless
of what a state tort claim is called, courts have
recognized that state law must yield.'0 7 The Generic
Pharmaceutical Association, in its amicus curiae
brief in support of Mutual, argues that if the mere
ability of a manufacturer to withdraw a product
from the market was sufficient to defeat preemption,
it is unclear when the Supremacy Clause would
have any force.' 08 Conversely, Respondent Bartlett
argues that nothing in federal law precludes Mutual
from complying with state law as federal law does
not require manufacturers to sell sulindac and
Mutual's decision to manufacture it is entirely its
own.109 Bartlett further states there is no conflict of
law under PLIVA, Inc., because this case involves
design defect, while PLIVA, Inc., involved failure to
warn, an entirely different cause of action.'1 0 In their
amicus curiae brief in support of Bartlett, American
Association for Justice, and Public Justice argue that
Congress did not intend to deprive compensation
to individuals who are injured by drugs, and design
defect claims compliment the objectives of the
FDCA of approving only safe and effective drugs.'
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Different suggestions have been made for how to fix
the paradox of the Hatch-Waxman Act's unintended
consequence of denying any liability to patients
injured by generic drugs."12 However, as stated in
Bartlett,"3 a better alternative may be to empower
states, through the judicial means of state torts
suits, to disallow any company from selling a drug
with questionable safety and effectiveness "if risk-
benefit analysis weights against the drug." 14 This
could provide a plaintiff with a strict liability design
defect case theory against a generic manufacturer.' 15
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Alternatively, the Hatch-Waxman Act could be
amended to explicitly state that the burden is placed
on manufacturers of equivalent drugs to monitor
the labels and safety of both the generic version of
the brand-name version through a modified market
share liability scheme.' 16
A. Allow risk-benefit analysis in a design defect
case against a generic manufacturer.
In Wyeth v. Levine, the Court rejected the idea that
the FDA retains the burden of proper labeling for
a drug at all times. 117 In fact, the Court stated that
"it has remained a central premise of federal drug
regulation that the manufacturer bears responsibility
for the content of its label at all times."ls The Court
provided evidence for this statement by referring to
the CBE changes established in 2007 that allow the
FDA to order manufacturers to revise their labels.' 19
The Court stated that under the CBE process,
Congress granted the FDA the authority to allow
brand-name drug manufacturers to unilaterally
strengthen their warning labels.120 In doing so,
Congress reaffirmed the manufacturer's obligation
to increase label warnings when necessary. 121 This
reflects the manufacturer's ultimate responsibility for
its label by providing a mechanism for adding safety
information to the label prior to FDA approval.122
Therefore, in Wyeth, the Court held that Wyeth had a
duty to provide a warning that "adequately described
the risk" of Phenergan.123
Interestingly, the Court in Wyeth did not make
a distinction between generic and brand-name
manufacturer's responsibilities with regard to the
content of a warning label.124 The Court in PLIVA
Inc. v. Mensing distinguished Wyeth, stating that
in Wyeth, the manufacturer was a brand-name
manufacturer who had the power to unilaterally
change its label without FDA approval.125 In fact,
the Court in Wyeth emphasized the reasons why it is
almost exclusively the manufacturer's responsibility
for post-market surveillance of a drug.126 The
Court stated that the FDA has limited resources
with which to monitor the 11,000 drugs currently
on the market.127 Second, manufacturers have a
large advantage over the FDA regarding access to
information and awareness of new adverse effects.128
Finally, it is more likely that consumers will contact
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the manufacturer of the drug rather than the FDA
in order to obtain financial compensation.129 It is
clear that the burden of retaining responsibility
for monitoring the drug even after it is on the
market applies equally to brand-name and generic
manufacturers.130
When the Court in PLIVA distinguished Wyeth
as a case about a generic drug manufacturer, it
could not have meant that these requirements for
post-market surveillance do not apply to generic
manufacturers.131 In fact, the Court in Wyeth stated
that "the FDA's views are 'controlling unless plainly
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation[s]' or
there is any other reason to doubt that they reflect the
FDA's fair and considered judgment." 32 Thus, as the
FDA has determined that it is almost exclusively the
manufacturer's responsibility to conduct post-market
surveillance, surely this must apply to generic drug
companies, as they are also drug manufacturers.133
The entry of many new generic drugs on the market
due to the Hatch-Waxman Act, and the small amount
of resources available for the FDA to monitor the
more than ten thousand drugs on the market remain
controlling factors even when the plaintiff happens
to be a generic manufacturer.134
As in Bartlett, it therefore seems that a plaintiff in
a state tort suit against a generic drug manufacturer
may be able to prevail on a design defect theory of
liability.135 This is because the generic manufacturer
has a duty to weigh the risks and benefits ofproducing
the drug, and it can be held liable for choosing to
make an unreasonably dangerous product.136 Even
though the FDA had never withdrawn its "safe and
effective" approval of the drug, the manufacturer
could nonetheless be held liable for making a product
with risks of harm that outweigh the benefits.'37
Under this scheme, state juries would be allowed to
second guess the FDA's approval as an additional
layer of oversight for manufacturers.138 Accordingly,
manufacturers would have to give careful thought as
to whether they ought to be making the drug at all.139
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the
applicability of design defect claims in cases such as
the federal preemption claims in PLIVA.1 40 However,
the Supreme Court noted that the result in PLIVA
was "unfortunate," "bizarre" and "unusual."'41
Therefore, the Supreme Court may be likely to uphold
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a tort claim against a generic drug manufacturer
under the design defect theory of liability.'42
B. Require manufacturers of equivalent drugs
to monitor the generic and brand-name version
under a modified shared market liability theory.
The Court in PLIVA noted the bizarre outcome of
Mensing's state tort claim due to FDA regulations.143
Had Mensing been given the brand-name Reglan
instead of the generic version metoclopramide,
she would have prevailed in her case against
the brand-name manufacturer." Mensing was
given metoclopramide at the discretion of her
pharmacist. 145 It is unlikely that most consumers of
generic drugs would know the minutiae of FDCA
regulations well enough to ask for the brand-name
version as an assurance they would succeed in a
failure to warn claim. Further, many insurance plans
require that prescriptions be filled by generic drugs.
Therefore, as the current system provides incentives
for making generic drugs more available and less
expensive to increase accessibility to important
medicines, it also follows that the drug companies
responsible for creating increased access should be
held responsible if their products cause harm. 146
As the regulations currently stand, generic
manufacturers cannot independently change the
label warnings as a brand-name manufacturer is able
to do.147 To remedy this, Congress could amend 21
C.F.R. §§ 314.70 and 314.97 to allow generic drug
manufacturers to be able to unilaterally strengthen
their warning labels.148 However, this could possibly
lead to consumer confusion as the same drug could
contain different warnings.149
Alternatively, Congress could amend the FDCA to
explicitly place the burden on the manufacturers of
equivalent brand-name and generic drugs to monitor
their version of the listed drug and assess damages
under a modified version ofthe shared market liability
theory.1 s0 The concept of market share liability was
first introduced in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.151
Judith Sindell brought a state tort action, on behalf
of herself and others, against Abbott Laboratories
and other companies who manufactured the drug
diethylstilbesterol ("DES").152 DES was a synthetic
version of estrogen, taken by pregnant women to
prevent miscarriages between 1941 and 1971 .153
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DES posed a high risk, and indeed caused cancerous
vaginal and cervical growths in thousands of
daughters whose mothers took the drug during
pregnancy.154 The cancer and growths spread quickly
and required painful and frequent surgeries and
medical procedures.15 During the period in which
DES was marketed, the makers of the drug knew, or
should have known of the risk of cancer, as well as the
drug's ineffectiveness at preventing miscarriages.1 56
Despite evidence showing that DES was not safe
or effective, its makers continued to produce it and
market it as a miscarriage preventative.' 57 Sindell's
mother took DES as a miscarriage preventative, and
as a result, Sindell developed a malignant bladder
and adenosis. 58
Sindell argued, and the Supreme Court of California
agreed, that each of the defendants were jointly liable
as they acted in concert, on the basis of express and
implied agreements, and in reliance upon the FDA's
approval and each other's testing and marketing
methods.159 The court emphasized that it was of great
importance that the drugs each company produced
were fungible, meaning the drugs are identical as to
be freely exchangeable.160 Thus, the court held that
each manufacturer's liability would be equivalent to
the share of the market it held at the time the drug
was taken.'61 However, if a manufacturer could
prove that it did not, or could not have manufactured
the drug at issue in the case, it would not be liable
for damages.162 Therefore, if a plaintiff knew which
manufacturer produced the drug that caused the
harm, market share liability was precluded.163
To apply the market share liability theory to a failure
to warn case against a generic drug manufacturer, the
theory would need to be modified. The requirement
that the plaintiff be unaware of exactly what
manufacturer caused the harm would need to be
eliminated, as the person who is injured by a generic
drug is aware of what company manufactured the
drug.' 64 This way, a patient who is injured by a
generic drug would have a course of action against
all of the drug companies who make the drug,
regardless of whether they are generic or brand-
name manufacturers,' 65 Under this framework, the
drug company would have to pay the percentage
of damages equal to its percentage of the market
it occupies for the drug it is selling.166 The policy
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behind this is that all manufacturers of a drug that
is potentially very dangerous should be responsible
for the effects thereof.167 In this manner, drug
companies would have an incentive for working
together with and sharing improved technology
and knowledge of adverse events. 168 It would likely
create cooperation between drug companies that
manufacture bioequivalent drugs, brand-name or
generic, as each would have an incentive to account
for all risks, as all would be responsible if a person is
injured due to a failure to warn.
V. CONCLUSION
It is inherently unfair that a patient who receives
a drug from a pharmacist who made a decision to
substitute a generic version of a drug for a brand-
name version will be unable to prevail in a failure to
warn tort case, despite how horrific their damages
are. The Hatch-Waxman Act provides incentives
for generic drug companies to enter the market for
the laudable goal of increasing access to new drugs.
However, the federal regulations that implement the
Act require that the labeling of the generic drug be
identical to that of the brand-name drug. This creates
the unintended consequence of prohibiting a generic
drug manufacturer from strengthening its warning
label, regardless of how many documented cases it
receives of adverse effects. Further, due to federal
preemption, the Supreme Court has held that generic
manufacturers cannot warn against adverse effects
without the brand-name manufacturer doing so first.
Moreover, as federal regulations currently stand, a
brand-name manufacturer has no duty to change
its label even in response to pleas from a generic
drug manufacturer. This leads to the real world
consequence of severely injured patients being left
with no form of recourse against a company whose
product injured them. To remedy this problem, the
FDCA could be amended to allow courts to conduct
risk-benefit analysis of the reasonable safety of the
drug itself, and expressly state that failure to warn and
design defects claims are not federally preempted. In
this way, a generic manufacturer could be held liable
under a theory of design defect in products liability,
rather than under a theory of failure to warn. This
would force generic manufacturers to consider
whether they ought to be making a drug with severe
62 ...
adverse effects. However, it would be preferable to
amend FDCA to allow generic manufacturers to
change their warnings, as this would allow some
drugs that would potentially be taken off the market
under the design defect theory would to remain on
the market.
Alternatively, Congress could amend the FDCA to
explicitly place the burden on manufacturers who
manufacture equivalently identical drugs to monitor
each other through a modified market share liability
scheme. Under this scheme, all manufacturers of a
bioequivalent drug would be held liable for damages
caused by that drug in proportion to their share
of the market of the drug. This would cause the
market to police itself, independently checking the
warning label, and creating a sense of urgency in the
brand-name drug to change its label in response to
reporting of adverse events. In either case, Congress
must act to provide individuals who are injured by
generic drugs with an avenue of recourse.
I See generally 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006); PL. 75-717 (1938)
(as amended by P.L. 112-144 (July 9, 2012)).
2 See 21 U.S.C § 355(); P.L. 98-417 (1984).
3 See id.
4 See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of
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